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Abstract—This paper contributes to the study of PUFs vul-
nerability against modeling attacks by evaluating the security of
XOR BR PUFs, XOR TBR PUFs, and obfuscated architectures of
XOR BR PUF using a simplified mathematical model and deep
learning (DL) techniques. DL modeling attacks were invoked
against PUFs with different stage sizes (e.g. 64, 128, 256) and
all are implemented on FPGA chips. Obtained results show
that DL modeling attacks could easily break the security of
4-input XOR BR PUFs and 4-input XOR TBR PUFs with
modeling accuracy ∼ 99%. Similar attacks were executed using
single-layer neural networks (NN) and support vector machines
(SVM) with polynomial kernel and the obtained results showed
that single NNs failed to break the PUF security. Furthermore,
SVM results confirmed the same modeling accuracy reported
in previous research (∼ 50%). For the first time, this research
empirically shows that DL networks can be used as powerful
modeling techniques against these complex PUF architectures
for which previous conventional machine learning techniques had
failed. Furthermore, a detailed scalability analysis is conducted
on the DL networks with respect to PUFs’ stage size and
complexity. The analysis shows that the number of layers and
hidden neurons inside every layer has a linear relationship with
PUFs’ stage size, which agrees with the theoretical findings in
deep learning. Consequently, A new obfuscated architecture is
introduced as a first step to counter DL modeling attacks and it
showed significant resistance against such attacks (16% - 40%
less accuracy). This research provides an important step towards
prioritizing the efforts to introduce new PUF architectures that
are more secure and invulnerable to modeling attacks. Moreover,
it triggers future discussions on the removal of influential bits
and the level of obfuscation needed to confirm that a specific PUF
architecture is resistant against powerful DL modeling attacks.
Index Terms—Physically unclonable functions (PUFs), Deep
learning, Machine learning, Modeling attacks, Hardware security.
I. INTRODUCTION
For more than 15 years, physically unclonable functions
(PUFs) have been considered as promising cryptographic
primitives that can be used in a wide range of security applica-
tions, such as identification, authentication, and cryptographic
key generation [1] [2] [3].
Intrinsic electronic PUFs are the most widely proposed
architectures in literature because they are more secure and
easier to realize on silicon chips without equipment and pro-
cessing overhead [4]. There exist two main types of intrinsic
PUFs, where they both depend on delay measurements by
either using an arbitration circuit (delay-based PUFs) or the
bi-stability property of memory cells (memory-based PUFs).
Delay-based strong PUFs depend on symmetrical paths where
a signal traverse these paths depending on an input chal-
lenge and the response depends on an arbitration circuitry
that determines which path is shorter. The advantage of
this PUFs type is the large input challenge-response space
which makes it hard to use brute force attacks to break their
security. However, delay-based PUFs have response reliability
issues when operating under temperature and voltage variation
conditions [5]. Moreover, most of the architectures showed
vulnerability against modeling attacks using their collected
challenge-response pairs (CRPs) for training [6] [7].
Proposals of new PUF architectures tried to merge be-
tween delay-based and memory-based approaches to design
a stronger PUF with more resistance against modeling attacks
and large challenge space, so CRPs cannot be exhaustively
read by the attackers. One of these proposals is the Bistable
Ring PUF (BR PUF), introduced in [8] and [9]. Its basic idea
is that the output of any given ring with an even number of
inverters has only two possible stable states. This is similar to
memory-based PUFs operation except that challenge bits are
inserted to select which path to be used at every stage (more
details in the next section). One problem of BR PUFs is that
it takes a longer time to stabilize, which is an undesirable
property of PUFs. Furthermore, BR PUFs implementations
on FPGAs showed an output bias problem as reported in
[10]. As a result, other variations of BR PUFs were proposed
like the Twisted Bistable Ring PUFs (TBR PUF) [10] and
the XOR BR PUFs in [11]. The latter was proposed after
successful modeling attacks were reported against BR PUFs
and TBR PUFs using SVM and single-layer Artificial Neural
Network (ANN). XOR BR PUFs showed significant resistance
against modeling attacks and set an example that the approach
of complicating the relationship between input challenges
and responses can somehow countermeasure conventional ML
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modeling techniques used to break the security of previous
architectures. However, it was shown in [12] that BR PUF
families have a finite set of influential challenge bits and can
be considered a Linear Threshold Function (LTF) similar to
Arbiter PUFs (APUFs). Hence, an XOR version of BR PUFs
can be modeled using a single-layer perceptron function as was
reported in [13] against XOR APUFs. In this paper, we show
that XOR BR and XOR TBR PUFs cannot be modeled using
a single layer NN and we needed to use deeper architecture
along with a simplified mathematical model to fully break their
security.
Our motivation is based on the current status of PUFs design
efforts, which part of the focus on introducing new architec-
tures solely depending on more complex challenge-response
relationships, and measure the architectural enhancement by
how resistant these PUFs are to conventional ML modeling
attacks. However, the development in DL techniques and the
hardware running them with acceptable timing performance
put more pressure and challenges on those PUF architectures.
Hence, the contributions of this paper can be listed as follows:
1) Showing that XOR BR and XOR TBR PUFs cannot be
modeled using single NNs and justifying the necessity
to use deeper networks.
2) Applying deep learning modeling techniques to attack 4-
input XOR BR PUF, XOR TBR PUF, and an obfuscated
version of XOR BR PUF and successfully breaking their
security with different stage sizes (e.g. 64, 128, 256) and
achieving a remarkable modeling accuracy > 99%.
3) Taking the first step to connect between DL theory and
our empirical results to understand why DL attacks work
successfully and based on that we introduced a new ob-
fuscated version of XOR BR PUF as a countermeasure.
4) Providing detailed analysis on the scalability of DL
modeling techniques in terms of layers number and hid-
den neurons needed with respect to the PUF architecture
complexity and number of PUF stages.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
discusses the background and further motivation for our work.
Sections III and IV show the detailed hardware implementa-
tion of XOR BR PUFs, XOR TBR PUFs and the obfuscated
versions of XOR BR PUF. Section V describes in detail the
DL network architecture, experiments setup and all decisions
taken to apply a successful modeling attack. Obtained results
and discussions on DL and attack practicality are provided in
Section VI followed by the conclusion in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
A. Bistable ring PUFs
Numerical Modeling attacks against delay-based PUFs were
one of the earliest attacking techniques proposed in the liter-
ature [6]. Given a set of CRPs and using machine learning
techniques like SVM, Logistic Regression (LR), and Evolution
Strategy (ES), it is possible to accurately predict the PUF
outcome for the whole challenge-response space. In [6] and
[7], Ruhrmair U. et al introduced an accurate mathematical
model for APUFs that can be exploited by machine learning
techniques to model PUFs response. This parametric model
could also be expanded for other delay-based PUFs (e.g XOR
PUFs, FeedForward PUFs). Therefore, the security of most
delay-based PUF architectures could be broken [6], [14], [7],
and [15]. Hence, BR PUF was introduced as a new hybrid
architecture to countermeasure the modeling attacks on delay-
based PUFs. The new idea was to place an even number of
PUF stages in a closed loop and the input challenge bits will
determine which gates will be involved in every stage. As
shown in Figure 1, every stage has two NOR gates working
as inverters, a multiplexer and a de-multiplexer controlled by
the challenge bits to determine which inverters contribute to
the loop. The sequence of operations starts by setting the reset
signal to ’1’ to force all stages to output ’0’, then applying the
challenge bits, and clearing the reset signal to ’0’, and finally
waiting for the ring output to be stable before reading it out.
Fig. 1: BR PUF Architecture [8]
Since the BR PUF architecture is operating like memory-
based PUFs, it was expected that no mathematical model could
be built for such architecture. However, there exist several
reported machine learning attacks against BR PUFs by either
using a simplified mathematical model [11] [10] or without
a model [12]. Furthermore, it was found that the BR PUF’s
responses were not uniform and are biased [11]. Hence, the
TBR PUF was introduced by Schuster D. and Hesselbarth R.
after successfully breaking the security of the BR PUF using
a single layer NN and a simplified mathematical model (i.e.
replacing every ’0’ challenge bit with ’-1’) [10]. This new
variant of BR PUF makes all inverters involved in the closed-
loop, and the challenge bits are responsible for determining
the positions of inverters inside the ring (odd or even).
Although this architectural modification showed more re-
sistance against ANN attacks and more uniform responses,
in the same paper, it was noted that NNs were learning the
correlation between challenge bits and responses and there
might exist more influential bits that helped in modeling BR
and TBR PUFs. Gangi F. et al [12] proposed a new attack
against BR and TBR PUFs that does not require deriving
a mathematical model of the BR PUF family. The main
idea is to exploit the challenge bits with higher influence on
the PUF responses (influential challenge bits) to construct a
machine-learning-based boosted model that can predict the
PUF outcome with high probability. The experiments were
conducted using 30K CRPs collected from 64 stages BR and
TBR PUF implementations on Altera Cyclone IV FPGAs,
and the adaptive boost algorithm [16] was used to create the
boosted classifier built over the initial weak learners, which
depends on single influential bits. Obtained results showed that
the boosting technique could successfully model both PUFs
up to 99% prediction accuracy using 50 boosting iterations.
Furthermore, they suggested that BR and TBR PUFs have
a small set of influential bits and their polynomial threshold
function (PTF) can be approximated by an LTF.
B. XOR Bistable ring PUFs
In [11], Xu X. et al could build a simplified mathematical
model to attack BR and TBR PUFs using SVM modeling
technique. Instead of deriving an accurate non-linear model
of PUF delays, A simplified additive model was adopted to
represent the difference between the pull-up and pull-down
strength of every inverter (represented by a NOR gate in
Figure 1). Hence, the PUF response can be re-written as the
summation of all stages’ strength difference and therefore,
SVM works by learning the weights assigned to every inverter
strength difference. Equations 1 to 3 explain the model
parameters, where ’ti’ and ’bi’ are the pull-up and pull-down
strength difference for the top and bottom NOR gate at the ith
stage. Hence, an even stage will contribute to a positive PUF
response with strength ti or bi depending on the challenge
bit value and odd stages will contribute with strength −ti or
−bi. A generalization of these terms can be used to represent
the odd and even stages contribution in this form ’−1iti’ and
’−1ibi’. In equation 2, Xu X. et al defined two terms ’αi’
and ’βi’ to facilitate the writing of PUF response summation
equation with respect to input challenge bits. Hence, PUF
response can be represented as a linear summation as shown
in equation 3, where ’K’ is the number of PUF stages and ’Ci’
∈ −1, 1 is the challenge bit at this stage (note that 0 value is
interpreted as -1 to select the bottom NOR gate). Furthermore,
the term ’αi’ can be discarded because it yields the same value
for all CRPs training samples.
∆Strengthiupper = −1iti, ∆Strengthibuttom = −1ibi (1)
αi + βi = −1iti , αi − βi = −1ibi , hence
αi = −1i( ti + bi
2
) , βi = −1i( ti − bi
2
)
(2)
Tresponse = Sign(
K∑
i=0
(αi + Ciβi)) (3)
The experimental results showed that BR and TBR PUFs
could be successfully attacked using SVM with modeling
accuracy > 95%. Hence, XOR BR PUF was introduced to
countermeasure this attack and the results showed that the
SVM modeling technique with polynomial kernel was not
successful in breaking architectures with XOR input > 3 as
shown in Table I.
C. Motivation for deep learning attacks
Gangi F. et al [13] showed that XORed LTFs (e.g. APUFs)
with the number of XOR inputs < ln(number of PUF stages)
TABLE I: Reported results of SVM modeling attack on XOR
BR PUF [11].
XOR inputs Stages Training Size Modeling Accuracy
3 32 1200 > 95%
3 64 7200 > 95%
3 128, 256 N/A 50.1%
4 32,64,128,256 N/A 50.1%
can be learned using single-layer perceptron function in poly-
nomial time. Consequently, if BR PUFs can be approximated
by an LTF because of the finite set of influential bits as dis-
cussed earlier, then it is expected that using a single layer NN
can model XOR BR PUFs. However, we conducted an analysis
on the implemented XOR BR and TBR PUF instances using
linear discriminant analysis (LDA) to confirm if both classes
representing PUF response are linearly separable or not. LDA
is a supervised linear transformation technique used to reduce
features dimensionality by computing the linear discriminants
or the directions of the axes at which, the separation between
multiple classes is maximized [17]. As a result, all XOR BR
and TBR PUF instances with different sizes (64, 128, 256)
showed similar behavior to the example in Figure 2. It shows
the density function of 1M data samples representing both PUF
response classes ’0’ and ’1’. It is clear that both curves are
overlapping and hence, they are not linearly separable, and
a single layer perceptron algorithm cannot model this type
of architectures. One might attribute the different behavior of
XOR BR PUFs compared to XOR APUFs to the fact that we
could derive an accurate additive linear model for the latter. On
the other hand, the mathematical model of XOR BR PUFs is a
simplified one. It is shifting from modeling delay difference to
a more abstract concept of modeling the strength difference of
every stage as discussed earlier. Furthermore, this also justifies
why SVM with polynomial kernel could not break XOR BR
PUF security while it was reported in previous literature that
similar XOR LTFs (i.e. APUFs) could be broken using logistic
regression technique (LR) [6] [7].
Fig. 2: Density function of LDA feature analysis for 128 stage
4-input XOR BR PUF
Hence, the motivation behind this work was to explore the
ability of deep learning modeling techniques to break the
security of XOR BR PUFs. Furthermore, experiments were
executed to attack XOR TBR PUFs since they showed more
resistance to ANN modeling attacks compared to BR PUFs.
Therefore, XOR TBR PUF was expected to be harder to break
and introduces an extra challenge.
III. HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION ON FPGA
A. Overall system architecture
In our implementation, we used the Mojo V3 Board which
features a Spartan-6 Xilinx FPGA alongside an AVR micro-
controller. As shown in Figure 3, the PUF is implemented on
the FPGA side in addition to a Finite State Machine (FSM)
for control as well as a UART module for receiving challenges
and sending responses. The UART module on top of the FPGA
is connected to the UART of the AVR microcontroller, which
in return transfers the data through the USB port of the Mojo
board to and from an external PC.
UART Module
TxRx
FPGA
AVR 
Microcontroller
TxRx
D+
D-
U
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T
U
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USB
Mojo V3 Board
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Fig. 3: PUF Ecosystem
A script employed on the PC side is responsible for generat-
ing and sending random challenges to the board, receiving the
responses and storing them into log files in order to evaluate
the PUF’s characteristics as will be discussed in Section III-C.
Challenges are generated using a Galois Linear-Feedback
Shift Register (LFSR) pseudo-random number generator on
the PC side and sent to the PUF through serial communication
to the FPGA byte by byte, where the FSM stores each byte and
concatenates them to form the full challenge vector. After the
FSM forms the full challenge vector, it transfers it to the PUF
at once as well as releasing the reset signal for the PUF at the
same time. Then the FSM waits for a predetermined time so
that the PUF converges to a stable state before capturing the
response. BR and TBR PUFs’ response is usually the output
of one stage of the ring, however, in our implementation, we
derived all the stages’ outputs to make sure that all stages have
the same capacitive load, as otherwise one stage would have
different load than others, which might bias the PUF. The same
note was considered in previous literature in [18]. Another
advantage of deriving all stages’ outputs is to distinguish
between converged and non-converged responses. To do so, the
response bytes are ORed together forming one byte that is sent
to the PC side. For a converged ring, that byte should be either
‘10101010’ (0xAA) representing ’1’ or ‘01010101’ (0x55)
representing ’0’, other than that, it indicates a non-converged
ring, which should not be added to the CRPs database.
B. Implementation approaches
A single stage of the BR PUF as introduced in [8] should
contain one MUX, one DEMUX and two inverting elements
such as NOR gates as in Figure 1. A straight forward imple-
mentation on the FPGA would result in five Look Up Tables
(LUTs) as in Figure 4a which was the approach used in [18]. In
our implementation though, we introduced an optimization to
the architecture level by removing the DEMUX. As eventually
the MUX chooses between the output of either NOR gates,
which is the important issue for the BR PUF functionality,
however, whether supplying the input to only one NOR gate
as in the original design or to both NOR gates as in our
optimized design, it would not make a difference to the BR
PUF functionality. With this optimization the number of LUTs
is reduced to three as in Figure 4b.
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Fig. 4: BR PUF Optmization Layout on FPGA
For the TBR PUF introduced in [10], the components of a
single stage can be interpreted as 2 MUXes feeding the 2 NOR
gates and two other MUXes choosing between the outputs
of the two NOR gates which was also adopted in [12]. A
straight forward implementation would try to transform each
component of the PUF into a separate LUT as in Figure 5a
resulting in a total of 6 LUTs for one TBR PUF stage.
However, in our implementation, we merged each NOR gate
with its preceding MUX as shown in Figure 5b resulting
in a total of only 4 LUTs for one TBR PUF stage. This
optimization does not affect the functionality of the TBR PUF
as it maintains two inverting elements and two different paths,
in addition to the fact that the merged LUT actually has the
same logic of the two separate LUTs combined.
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Fig. 5: TBR PUF Optmization Layout on FPGA
The reasons behind these optimizations were that both PUFs
with 128-bit and 256-bit challenge were not possible to be
implemented on the FPGA without the optimization due to
the limited LUTs on the FPGA. Preliminary experiments were
conducted over the non-optimized implementations for 64-bit
BR and TBR PUFs to empirically confirm that the optimiza-
tions presented for both BR and TBR PUFs do not affect the
security of the PUFs. The obtained results showed that non-
optimized architectures showed similar performance against
both SVM and DL techniques. Thus, these optimizations do
not change the PUFs’ architectures and empirically do not
affect their security.
C. PUF characteristics
A good PUF should achieve three main properties: reliabil-
ity, unpredictability, and uniqueness [19]. In this section, we
define the evaluation metrics that measure these three proper-
ties and provide the actual characteristics for the implemented
PUFs. These metrics are PUF noise, PUF bias, and inter-
chip hamming distance. We also considered another important
characteristic which is individual challenge bits influence.
1) PUF Noise: A reliable PUF would give a consistent
response to a certain challenge per chip, however, in
reality, a PUF might give inconsistent responses for the
same challenge. To measure noise, we apply the same
challenge to the same chip for many iterations, take a
majority vote to determine the supposedly right response
and repeat that for all challenges. Thus we can calculate
the noise as in equation 4 with an ideal value of 0.
N =
∑
# wrong responses
# iterations×# challenges (4)
2) PUF Bias: Which represents the tendency of the PUF to
respond with 0 or 1 to different challenges. Bias can be
calculated as in equation 5 with an ideal value of 0.5.
B =
# responses of ′1′
# challenges
(5)
3) Inter-Chip Hamming Distance: Different chips should
give different responses for the same challenge. Inter-
chip hamming distance represents how many responses
were dissimilar for the same challenge on different
chips. The normalized hamming distance between two
different chips would be calculated as in equation 6 with
an ideal value of 0.5.
NHD =
# dissimilar responses
# challenges
(6)
4) Individual Challenge Bits Influence: Challenge bits
should ideally contribute equally to the resulted re-
sponse, not only some of the challenge bits. For each
challenge bit, its influence is calculated as in equations 7
and 8 with an ideal value of 0.5 for both.
Infl(i, 0) =
# responses of ′1′
# challenges with ith bit = 0
(7)
Infl(i, 1) =
# responses of ′1′
# challenges with ithbit = 1
(8)
To obtain the actual characteristics of the implemented
PUFs detailed in Table II, we used three typical Mojo boards,
loaded the same PUF design on all of them and applied
1 Million different challenges each for three iterations. All
experiments were conducted in room temperature.
An important note is that as we had the ability to distin-
guish between converged and non-converged responses, we
excluded the non-converged responses from characteristics
calculations. Moreover, training and testing sets contained
only the converged responses after the majority vote, thus
eliminating PUFs noise for the neural networks. It is important
to note that all results presented in Table II are for the XORed
PUFs treated as a black box, not for individual PUFs. Also,
the reported characteristics are averages over the three chips,
except for the bias being reported for each chip.
TABLE II: Implemented PUFs Characteristics
Characteristic
PUF Size & Type
BR PUF TBR PUF
64 128 256 64 128 256
Eval. Time (Cyc.) 1024 4000 9600 6000 13400 19000
Conv. Avg. (%) 81 82 86 74 73 69
Noise Avg. (%) 1 2 1 3 3 3
Bias Chip 1 (%) 48 50 47 51 47 53
Bias Chip 2 (%) 49 49 54 54 52 47
Bias Chip 3 (%) 47 48 53 53 53 49
NHD Avg. (%) 49 53 52 50 47 52
Max Infl. (%) 43 47 58 59 56 45
As shown in Table II, the implemented PUFs have near-ideal
characteristics for bias and inter-chip hamming distance. Even
noise is negligible because we eliminated the non-converged
responses. The non-converged responses ranged from 14% to
31% corresponding to convergence rates between 86% and
69%, which is one of the drawbacks of BR and TBR PUFs.
The reported cycles spent waiting for convergence before
capturing responses (the evaluation time) are the minimum
cycles needed to achieve the corresponding convergence rates,
(waiting for more time would not lead to any significant
improvement in the convergence rates).
Also as shown there are no individual influential bits. The
maximum influence a challenge bit can get is 59% which is
not a huge influence compared to the ideal influence of 50%.
IV. OBFUSCATED XOR BR PUF ARCHITECTURES AS
COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST DL ATTACKS
This section provides an overview of two obfuscated XOR
BR PUF architectures implemented to show how DL modeling
attacks perform against challenge obfuscation techniques and
how to develop countermeasures resistant to such attacks. the
obfuscation logic elements including memory-based PUFs and
multiplexers in both architectures are implemented in software
as a proof of concept. Hence, the original challenge is supplied
as input to the obfuscation logic and the output modified
challenge is sent to the hardware XOR BR PUFs as mentioned
in Section III-A. We adopted this approach because it is easier
to implement and reuse the deployed XOR BR PUF instances
with no impact on hardware functionality. Furthermore, We
are interested in the logical reasoning of how to design a new
architecture to thwart DL modeling attacks. Further hardware
and power overhead analysis is beyond the paper scope.
A. Obfuscated PUF architecture 1 (Hierarchical XOR BR
PUF)
This architecture adopts a similar obfuscation technique
to the one introduced in [20] by using a pool of memory-
based PUFs responses to XOR with the original challenge.
Fig. 6: The Multi-PUF Architecture introduced in [20]
Note that memory-based PUFs should have a 50% randomness
(50% responses are ’1’), therefore, nearly half of the challenge
bits will be inverted and the rest will pass through without
change. The XOR output result will be the new challenge to
the XOR BR PUF as shown in Fig 6. The PUF statistical
properties are similar to those in Table II because the same
PUF instances were used. Although this technique hides the
input PUF challenge, it suffers from two conceptual issues.
It does not solve the problem of the limited set of influential
bits for every BR PUF [12]. The relationship between the final
and original challenges is not complex enough because their
hamming distance will be constant all the time. Therefore,
it is expected that DL modeling attacks can overcome this
obfuscation and learn the appropriate transformation of input
features as will be shown in the results section.
B. Obfuscated PUF architecture 2 (N-to-1 Shuffled-Challenge
Hierarchical XOR BR PUF)
In this obfuscation technique, we try to improve the ar-
chitecture in terms of the limited number of influential bits
and the relationship between the original and final challenges.
Firstly the N-to-1 term denotes that every N bits of the
original challenge are responsible for determining the value
of one final challenge bit. Fig 7 shows an example of a 2-
to-1 Shuffled-Challenge Hierarchical XOR BR PUF, where
every final challenge bit is derived by a multiplexer which its
select inputs are a pair of the original challenge bits selected
randomly. The conditions to be met are that no pairs are
repeated and that every bit is involved in determining the
value of two different final challenge bits. For this architecture,
there is no single bit responsible for determining the value of
any specific PUF stage. Furthermore, every bit impacts two
different bits of the final challenge. Hence, the number of
influential bits should increase and their relationship is more
complex. Additionally, In order to increase the randomness
between the original and final challenges, the position of every
final challenge bit at which a pair of bits determine its value is
randomly assigned for every chip. Moreover, the four memory-
PUF connected to every multiplexer inputs must represent 50%
’1’ values and their ordering is randomly selected from the
six available choices that have two ’1’s and ’0’s. These design
rules allowed this architecture to show a significant resistance
against DL modeling attacks as will be shown in the results
section.
Fig. 7: The 2-to-1 Shuffled-Challenge Hierarchical XOR BR
PUF Architecture
V. DEEP LEARNING NETWORK ARCHITECTURE AND
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
A. Deep neural network architecture
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are artificial networks with
multiple hidden layers between the input and output that can
model complex non-linear relationships among inputs better
than shallow ANNs. These types of networks start to build up
a complete inference about the complex problem by gaining
partial knowledge through the multiple hidden layers and
aggregate them together at the end to provide an accurate
classification/decision. For example, when a specific network
tries to classify an object in image processing applications, its
shallow layers extract features of edges and contours. Then,
the deeper layers connect between features to construct shapes
and classify the object at the output layer. Hence, the problem
of modeling a complex PUF architecture can be solved using
this approach. The DNN can learn the complex relationships
among different stages by discovering the easier correlations
between challenge features first and build upon that through
the network to classify the final PUF response. The type of
DNN used in this work is the feed-forward network, which
means the flow of data goes in one direction through multiple
layers from input to output as shown in Figure 8.
Fig. 8: The DNN network architecture used in modeling
attacks. All layers are fully connected layers.
Figure 8 shows the deep neural network architecture used
in the modeling attacks against XOR BR PUF and XOR TBR
PUF. All layers of the network are fully connected, which
means that every hidden neuron in layer n is connected to all
neurons in layer n+1. Every connection represents a weight
that reflects the neuron effect from the preceding layer on the
output produced by the neuron in the next layer. In the graph,
’m’ represents the number of input features which is one of
the values 64, 128, and 256 depending on the PUF number
of stages. The number of hidden neurons in every layer is
represented by ’K’ and the network depth is denoted by ’N’,
which corresponds to the number of fully connected layers in
the network. Although the values of K and N were varied in the
experiments to study the DNN scalability, the network used to
report the modeling accuracies results in section 5, has N = 12
and K = 2000. Finally, a dropout layer was placed between the
last fully connected layer and the output to help the network
generalization and avoid the problem of over-fitting.
In DNN, convolutional layers are used for extracting desired
features from input data. It applies a convolution process using
a set of filters on input data to detect important features related
to the task. Hence, the shallow layers are usually convolutional
layers to extract primitive features and reduce input size then
deeper layers are fully connected. This approach works in ob-
ject recognition and classification tasks due two main reasons.
Firstly, features in input images have a locality property, there-
fore, it is more efficient to apply smaller feature sized windows
to find pixels correlations. Secondly, the convolutional layers
are less computation-intensive. However, the locality property
does not exist in the context of modeling complex PUF
architectures. There might be correlations between different
PUF stages with distant positions or even among stages from
different PUFs (In case of having XOR PUF architecture).
Furthermore, these correlations will change from one PUF
instance to another, which makes using convolutional layers
not practical. Hence, using fully connected layers in the
network is like the brute-force technique to extract features
that help in modeling PUF response.
B. DNN training parameters
In this subsection we discuss the DNN parameters used in
our training processes. Firstly we used the logistic function in
our classification layer. It outputs a probability distribution
of the problem binary classes, which in our case a two-
class PUF response. The logistic function (σ) defined in
equation 9 maps the input x to an output between 0 and 1.
This value represents the probability that problem output will
belong to a specific class given the input x value as shown in
equation 10. The cross entropy is used as the loss function,
which measures the likelihood of a given set of parameters
θ of the model can result in a prediction of the correct
class of each input sample. The network tries to maximize
this likelihood function by using adaptive moment estimation
(Adam) optimization algorithm proposed by Kingma, D. and
Ba, J. [21]. Experiments showed that it converges faster and
introduces better accuracy results than the normal gradient
decent algorithm. The learning rate is usually between 0.0001
and 0.00001 for the training accuracy to be stable. For every
run we do 1M iterations and a stopping condition if training
accuracy is not changing to the 4th fractional digit for 5
consecutive times. Furthermore, if there is no convergence
after 1M iterations, we re-run it again, but for almost every
training process convergence would occur within the first 100K
iterations. We evaluate our models using the accuracy metrics,
which measures how many correct prediction cases out of the
whole test set.
σ(x) =
1
1 + e−x
(9)
P (t = 1|x) = σ(x) = 1
1 + e−x
,
P (t = 0|x) = 1− σ(x) = 1
1 + e−x
(10)
C. Modeling attacks using SVM with polynomial kernel
Experiments include attacks using SVM to test the resis-
tance of implemented XOR BR and XOR TBR PUFs against
conventional ML attacks and to further justify the need for
using DL techniques. A script is written using python and
scikit-learn library to provide SVM modeling functionality.
Note that a grid search was conducted first to tune the SVM
model parameters. Moreover, a polynomial kernel with degree
four (equivalent to the number of XOR inputs) is used as was
done by Xu et al in [11].
D. Hardware and software experimental setup
Experiments are conducted using three Mojo V3 boards,
each containing a Spartan 6 FPGA [22] (45nm process tech-
nology). All CRPs are generated using an LFSR as mentioned
in Section III. SVM attacks were executed on Intel 8th Gen I7-
8250 CPU with 16GB RAM of memory, and DL attacks were
executed using Nvidia GeForce GTX 1080 Ti GPU card with
11GB RAM.The Tensorflow platform was used to develop the
network architectures, training, and evaluation tasks. Finally,
scikit-learn library was used to implement SVM.
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. DL Modeling attack results
As mentioned earlier, modeling attacks were launched on
24 instances of 4-input XOR BR & TBR PUF with varying
stage size (64, 128, 256) and 64-stage obfuscated XOR BR
PUFs, which all were implemented on three mojo V3 boards.
The DNN used for the attack had 12 fully connected layers
and 2000 hidden neurons in every layer. Training set size was
varied between 5K to 1M CRPs. Furthermore, The same PUF
instances were attacked using SVM with a polynomial kernel
of degree four to account for the 4-input XOR function [11].
Finally, the test set size was 100K CRPs for all experiments
and CRPs were randomly generated as discussed in Section III.
Table III shows the modeling accuracy results for all XOR BR
PUF instances implemented on chip-1 using both approaches
(DL, SVM). Note that similar results were obtained for the
instances implemented on Chips 2 and 3.
It is shown in the table that DL modeling was successful
in breaking the security of all XOR BR PUF instances.
Furthermore, training using 100K CRPs was enough to reach
the accuracy boundary of 99% in the case of 64 stages and
1M CRPs to reach this accuracy value for 128 and 256 stages.
TABLE III: 4-input XOR BR PUF modeling accuracy
Train. Size
PUF Size & Modeling Technique
64-Bit 128-Bit 256-Bit
DL SVM DL SVM DL SVM
5K 67.6% 53.2% 51.8% 51.1% 88.8% 53.3%
10K 98.1% 54.1% 85.9% 51.8% 94.6% 53.3%
20K 99.2% 54.6% 96.7% 52.4% 96.4% 53.3%
50K 99.1% 55.2% 98.2% 53.7% 96.4% 53.4%
100K 98.1% 56.3% 98.8% 54.3% 96.7% 53.4%
1M 99.5% N/A 99.1% N/A 99.3% N/A
On the other hand, the SVM technique failed to successfully
model the PUFs and its accuracy matched what was reported
in previous literature for the same training size [11]. The
maximum modeling accuracy that could be reached by SVM
was 62.4% for the 64 stages PUF implemented on chip-2
using 100K CRPs for training. Moreover, SVM performance
got worse when attempting to model PUFs with bigger stage
sizes, while DNN did not seem to be affected by that. Instead,
The DL modeling technique was powerful enough to get
an accuracy > 95% using 20K CRPs for training. This is
relatively a small dataset size and generally, deep networks
need more samples to train on. In contrast, results show that
SVM failed to get higher than the 62% accuracy using up to
100K CRPs.
Table IV shows the modeling attacks results against 4-
input XOR TBR PUF on Chip-1 with varying stage size (64,
128, 256). Similarly, DL modeling techniques could break the
security of the XOR TBR PUF, while SVM showed nearly
the same performance as in XOR BR PUFs. However, the
models could achieve accuracy > 95% using more CRPs for
training than XOR BR PUFs (50K CRPs). Furthermore, the
maximum accuracy achieved was slightly less than or equal to
99%. This is expected because TBR PUFs involve all inverters
in its operation, hence a slightly more complicated architecture
than BR PUFs with the same number of challenge bits. In
addition, all instances implemented on chips 2 and 3 showed
similar behavior as the PUFs realized on chip 1.
TABLE IV: 4-input XOR TBR PUF modeling accuracy
Train. Size
PUF Size & Modeling Technique
64-Bit 128-Bit 256-Bit
DL SVM DL SVM DL SVM
5K 84.4% 56.7% 63.3% 53.7% 71.5% 59.4%
10K 85.9% 58.5% 76.4% 55.3% 87.2% 60.9%
20K 94.2% 59.8% 85.7% 57.7% 94.9% 62.4%
50K 97.1% 60.6% 95.6% 59.4% 97.1% 63.5%
100K 97.3% 60% 96.7% 62.5% 97.7% 62.9%
1M 98.8% N/A 98.8% N/A 98.7% N/A
Table V shows the modeling attacks results against ob-
fuscated 4-input XOR BR PUF architectures mentioned in
Section IV with stage size = 64. Similar to non-obfuscated
architectures, DL attacks could break the obfuscated PUF
Architecture 1 (Hierarchical XOR BR PUF). DL networks
could learn the hidden relationship between the original and
final challenges because the number of inverted bits and their
TABLE V: DL modeling accuracy(%) of obfuscated 64-Bit
4-input XOR BR PUF architectures on Chip-1.
Training size 20K 50K 100K
Obfuscated Architecture 1 97.1% 98% 99.1%
Obfuscated Architecture 2 58.2% 76.5% 82.3%
positions is always constant. Hence, It is easy for the DNN to
realize the transformation of input features. On the other hand,
Obfuscated PUF Architecture 2 (2-to-1 Shuffled-Challenge
Hierarchical XOR BR PUF) showed significant resistance
against DL attacks. Reducing accuracy by nearly 40% using
20K training CRPs and maximum accuracy achieved is 82%
using 100K CRPs. Furthermore, it was noted that training error
was small in all cases but test error of the trained model was
worse, which means that the obtained model generalization
gap was increased. This shows that the obfuscation technique
used in subsection IV-B was relatively successful in increasing
the randomness between the original and final challenges
and reducing the effect of influential bits. Further analysis is
required to enhance the resistance of this architecture against
DL attacks and study the hardware and power overhead.
However, it is worth mentioning that the multiplexers used
to modify the challenge can be used for all PUF instances
on the same chip, which reduces their overhead in terms
of both hardware and power. Finally, note that as previous
cases, instances implemented on chip2 and 3 showed similar
performance.
B. DNN scalability Vs. increasing PUF stages
The DNN architecture is built to mimic the way PUFs
operate to facilitate the learning process therefore, the hidden
neurons in one layer can be considered as the stages of one
PUF. Similarly, the number of layers can be used to reflect
the number of XOR inputs. Consequently, a question arises
about the network parameters and whether they should be
the same as the number of PUF stages and XOR inputs or
not. Note that increasing the network size can enhance or
complicate the task for the network to learn the non-linear
relationships among all stages. Accordingly, more experiments
were executed to study the DNN parameters scalability (i.e.
number of layers and number of hidden neurons per layer)
with respect to the PUFs complexity and number of stages.
Hence, the same modeling attack was invoked while varying
the DNN number of layers (1,4,8,12) and the hidden neurons
per layer (64, 128, 256, 512, 1024, 2048). Then, observe what
the maximum accuracy will be and how long the network
will take to converge. The training set size was chosen to be
1M CRPs in order to guarantee that obtained results depend
on how the network architecture is varied not because of
not enough training samples to train on. Total 432 training
processes were run on all the 4-input XOR BR and XOR TBR
PUF instances and Table VI shows the network configurations
that achieved maximum accuracy with minimum train time for
every type.
Obtained results show many interesting findings. Firstly,
single layer NNs failed to model any instance successfully and
TABLE VI: DNN Scalability Analysis On 4-input XOR BR
and TBR PUFs. Showing network configuration that achieved
best accuracy and minimum training time
PUF Type Accuracy Layers hiddenneurons
train. time
(min)
64-XOR-BR 99.5% 8 1024 4.8
128-XOR-BR 99.2% 8 1024 20
256-XOR-BR 99.1% 12 2048 15
64-XOR-TBR 98.8% 8 1024 6.8
128-XOR-TBR 98.8 8 1024 7.6
256-XOR-TBR 99% 4 2048 9.6
modeling accuracy ranged between 55% - 62% except for one
256 XOR BR PUF instance that achieved 70% accuracy. This
confirms the results obtained from LDA analysis discussed
in Subsection II-C, which showed that response classes are
linearly inseparable for these PUF types. Furthermore, Ta-
ble VI shows that for most cases maximum accuracy could
be achieved using smaller networks than the one used in our
initial experiments. This means the same results could have
been achieved in less training time than the bigger DNN.
Moreover, obtained results showed that network configura-
tions with 4 layers and 2048 hidden neurons and 8 layers with
any hidden size can achieve modeling accuracy > 90% for all
PUF sizes. Note that there is a trade-off between convergence
(number of iterations) and time, therefore for the 256 XOR
TBR case in Table VI a network with 4 layers converged
slower than a similar one with 12 layers but it still could finish
faster because it has way less number of computations. Hence,
given a constant number of XOR inputs, the network scales
linearly in terms of layers and hidden neurons with respect to
XOR BR PUF stage size.
As an illustration, the number of weights to be updated in
the network architecture shown in Figure 8 can be calculated
using equation 11.
# of Weights = (m×K) + ((N − 1)×K2) + (K× 2) (11)
Note that ’m’ is the number of PUF stages, ’K’ is the hidden
neurons per layer, and ’N’ is the number of fully connected
layers. Therefore, adding a new layer has K2 effect on the
number of weights and consequently the computations. Hence,
one should think of a balanced approach when constructing the
DNN network for similar PUF architectures by giving more
priority to increase neurons per layer first. The following step
is to slightly increase the number of layers to achieve the best
accuracy/time trade-off.
It is also worth mentioning that the training time shown
in Table VI is for achieving the maximum accuracy. Using
smaller network configurations could achieve a reasonable
accuracy of 95% in much less training time. Hence, these
timing figures are limited by the hardware used and the
acceptable accuracy desired.
C. Discussion on successful DL attacks and countermeasures
In order to understand why DL networks could model these
PUF architectures while SVM and single layer NN failed, the
sources of modeling errors should be identified. Hence, let
E(f) and En(f) be the test error and the training error for
any classifier f respectively. Furthermore, let F be the space of
functions that can be expressed by deep neural networks, f∗F
is the best classifier in the F space and f∗ is the best possible
classifier. If fˆ is the classifier function returned by the training
algorithm, then its excess error from the best possible classifier
ε , E(fˆ) − E(f∗) can be attributed to two main terms as
shown in equation 12 [23].
ε = [E(f∗F )− E(f∗)] + [E(fˆn)− E(f∗F )] (12)
The first term is called the approximation error and mea-
sures how well the desired function can be approximated by
a neural network using training samples. DNNs decrease the
approximation error because they can express the composition
of nonlinear functions effectively through their stacked layers
(near zero training error. ∼ 0.0001 in our case). It was shown
in [24] that deep networks have a linear relationship with
the input data dimension with respect to hidden neurons per
layer, while shallow networks require an exponential number
of neurons. This, in fact, was confirmed in our scalability
analysis, where networks with a deeper number of layers could
reach the 99% accuracy using neurons in the range of O(n)
with respect to n-stage PUFs. The second term in equation 12
refers to the estimation error, which measures how well the
trained model performs on out of sample data (generalization
capability). DNNs with a large number of parameters and fully
connected layers can control the generalization gap (small test
error, <1% in our case), if the complexity of all functions in
F space is not large [23].
As a result, the successful DL attacks against the BR
PUF family can be attributed to several reasons. Firstly the
effect of influential bits that was reported in [12], which
decreased the architecture complexity. Hence, introducing the
XOR relationship was not sufficient to increase the complexity
and counter the DL attacks. Furthermore, despite the use
of a simplified mathematical model that does not represent
the PUF operation accurately, DNNs could overcome that
because it can learn the appropriate transformation of input
features to correctly predict the target. Moreover, the lack
of randomness when attempting to hide the challenge bits
to counter DNNs modeling capabilities. Consequently, the
obfuscated architecture-1 could be attacked and modeled with
accuracy similar to non-obfuscated ones, while obfuscated
architecture-2 showed a far better resistance against the DL
attacks because it was built to minimize the effects of the
above-mentioned reasons. This could be achieved by allowing
more than one bit from the original challenge to determine
the value of every bit of the final input challenge supplied
to the PUF. Additionally, every original challenge bit affects
two different positions of the final input challenge. These
modifications resulted in increasing the randomness between
the original and final challenges and the architecture com-
plexity due to spreading the influence of every challenge
bit on more than one position. Hence, as was mentioned in
the results section, the generalization gap was increased and
the test accuracy of DL attacks was worse despite the low
training error achieved. Further analysis is needed to develop
more complex versions of this obfuscated PUF and statistical
metrics that measure the desired complexity of architectures
to increase the generalization gap and counter these types of
DL attacks.
D. The practicality of the DL attacks and applications
The discussion of DL modeling attacks involves the access
to PUF, the number of CRPs required for a successful attack,
and the power needed to read CRPs and perform the DL
training and build a model. In the context of strong PUFs(i.e.
BR PUF family), they are usually not protected against the
process of sending out challenges and reading out the response
to collect the CRPs necessary for the attack [7] [25] [26] [27].
However, there have been other authentication protocols that
hide the response using hash functions or other cryptographic
schemes [28] [29]. Therefore, for the DL modeling attacks
to work successfully against these types of controlled PUF
environment, The assumption is that the attacker gains physical
access to the PUF. Furthermore, the response hiding technique
may be overcome by probing the digital signals coming out
of the PUF before being input to the cryptographic logic used
to hide the response [6] and [7].
The results showed that an accuracy of 95% could be
achieved using 20K and 50K CRPs for XOR BR PUFs and
XOR TBR PUFs respectively. This number is surprisingly
small given the network architecture and large parameters
used for training. However, it is comparable to the number of
CRPs used in modeling attacks against 4-input XOR arbiter
PUFs, which used 12K and 20K CRPs to break the 64 and
128-bit PUFs respectively [7]. Additionally, it is normal that
electrical strong PUFs operate at frequencies of a few MHZ
[6]. For example, the mojo FPGA chips operate at 50 MHZ
and the maximum number of cycles needed for evaluation is
19K as mentioned in Table II. Hence, with eased conditions
and assuming it takes 20K cycle to read a response, it takes
∼ 7 mins to read 1M CRPs.
The task of collecting CRPs is not computationally in-
tensive, therefore, reading CRPs from chips with limited
hardware resources as in [29] is applicable under the above-
mentioned assumption. Additionally, as far as we know, there
was not any power analysis for CRPs collection task in the
previously published attacks. Although, the DNN training task
is computationally intensive it is possible now to execute
training tasks with minimized time and power cost using GPUs
& ASIC chips (e.g. Tensor processing unit TPU and other
accelerators). For cases where PUF attacks are not possible (
the CRPs are hidden, silicon probing is not possible, or battery-
power limits the number of CRPs), DNNs may be useful to
measure post-silicon PUF security validation before the chip
is employed in the field.
Other DL attacks were reported against variants of APUFs
[30], which means that DL modeling attacks can be considered
as a powerful tool in breaking the security of strong PUFs (i.e.
APUF variants and XOR BR PUF family including obfuscated
versions) using a simplified mathematical model. Furthermore,
these attacks are practical with respect to the number of CRPs
and the power needed to execute the attack. It is applicable to
break wide range of security protocols that use strong PUFs
for authentication [26] [27] [29], key establishment [31], and
Oblivious transfer protocols [32].
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this research, the deep learning modeling technique was
introduced as a powerful tool to attack and break the security
of complex strong PUF architectures implemented on real
FPGAs(24 instances on three chips). It was shown that DNN
can be used along with a simplified mathematical model to
attack 4-input XOR BR PUF, 4-input XOR TBR PUF with
varying number of stages (64, 128, 256), and a 64-stage
obfuscated Hierarchical XOR BR PUF and could successfully
model all their responses with modeling accuracy ∼ 99%. The
DL attacks on the XOR BR family are practical and easy
to launch because of the hardware and software support that
enables training tasks in a matter of minutes as discussed
in subsection VI-D. Furthermore, all successfully attacked
architectures needed only between 20K to 50K CRPs for
training to achieve modeling accuracy > 95%.
Even with the lack of an accurate mathematical model,
DNNs were shown to provide better performance than SVM
with polynomial kernel and single layer NNs likely due to the
ability of the nonlinear stacked layers to learn the appropriate
data transformations needed (as discussed at subsection VI-C).
Additionally, a detailed analysis was conducted to study the
scalability of DNNs used to model XOR BR and TBR PUF
architectures. This analysis included 432 modeling attacks
on all PUF instances using 24 network configurations for
every instance. Results showed that maximum accuracy can be
achieved using smaller network architectures and the number
of hidden neurons per layer scale linearly with the increase
of PUFs stage size (given that the number of XOR inputs
is constant), which agrees with the approximation theory of
DNN as discussed in subsection VI-C.
The 2-to-1 Shuffled-Challenge Hierarchical XOR BR PUF
was introduced as a new architecture to countermeasure the
DL attacks by overcoming the inherent problem of influential
bits in BR PUFs and increasing the randomness between
the original and final challenge bits. Hence, increasing the
architecture complexity and the generalization gap of the DL
model. Attacks on 64-stage instances showed significance
resistance and a promising first step towards an ideal resilience
against DL attacks.
Future work will investigate the scaling of DNNs while
varying the XOR input number. Moreover, the feasibility
of DL attacks against new PUF architectures with different
obfuscation techniques and countermeasures. Furthermore,
more analysis is required to develop new statistical metrics
to measure the appropriate level of obfuscation needed to
consider a specific PUF architecture secure.
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